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“UNITING FOR PEACE” AND HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION: THE AUTHORISING FUNCTION OF
THE U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Michael Ramsden †
Abstract:
Although the end of the Cold War has seen the functional
expansion of the United Nations Security Council, concerns still remain over its
legitimacy, driven in part by its failure to address serious and persistent human rights
abuses. While this has resurrected arguments in favour of the doctrine of humanitarian
intervention outside the U.N. Charter framework, little attention has been paid to how the
U.N. General Assembly may authorise such enforcement action under a U.N. mandate
through the invocation of the Uniting for Peace mechanism. Some dismiss Uniting for
Peace as little more than a relic of the Cold War, but, if properly conceived, the General
Assembly may authorise a humanitarian intervention where the Security Council is
deadlocked and has failed to accomplish its primary responsibility of maintaining
international peace and security. This article will consider the constitutional foundations
of the Uniting for Peace resolution and the scope for the General Assembly to assume
analogous functions to that of the Security Council in authorising enforcement action.

I.

INTRODUCTION

The United Nations Security Council (Council) is, by any legal
measure, an extraordinary institution. Possessing a broad power to render
mandatory decisions that bind members of the United Nations (U.N.), it may
also authorise measures up to and including forcible coercive action where it
determines there is a “threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of
aggression.” 1 In discharging its “primary responsibility” of maintaining
international peace and security, the Council has embraced a teleological
interpretation of its mandatory and coercive powers under the U.N. Charter
to address diverse security concerns. The expansion of the Council’s
constitutional powers following the end of the Cold War has included the
introduction of measures aimed at compelling the seizure of assets belonging
† Associate Professor; Assistant Dean (Research), Faculty of Law, Chinese University of Hong
Kong; Director, Centre for Rights and Justice (michaelramsden@cuhk.edu.hk).
1
See U.N. Charter arts. 39–42. The Council is one of six principal organs of the U.N., alongside
the General Assembly, the Trusteeship Council, the Economic and Social Council, the International Court
of Justice, and the Secretariat. The Council comprises fifteen Members: five of whom are permanent
(United States, United Kingdom, China, Russia, and France). The other ten members of the Council are
appointed on a non-permanent basis and hold their place for two-year terms. U.N. Charter art. 23. The
Council is commonly regarded as the “executive” arm of the U.N. given that it possesses binding powers
and a membership of states who are often able to ensure effective implementation. For further discussion
of the Council’s structure and powers, see EDWARD C. LUCK, UN SECURITY COUNCIL: PRACTICE AND
PROMISE (2006); NEIL FENTON, UNDERSTANDING THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL: COERCION OR CONSENT?
(2004).
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to terrorists, the creation of international ad hoc tribunals, the power to make
a referral to the International Criminal Court (ICC), and the ability to qualify
a humanitarian crisis as a “threat to the peace” even without any apparent
cross-border security dimension to the crisis. 2
Despite the impressive growth in the Council’s activities after the end
of the Cold War, its legitimacy remains in question. 3 Although legitimacy
may be measured in different ways, one concern in particular continues to
resonate: the perceived “misuse” of the veto in situations involving serious
human rights abuse, arising where permanent members act in their own
national interest instead of in a manner that best promotes the protection of
human rights and international security. The failure of the Council to avert
genocide in Rwanda or to exert any meaningful influence over the
humanitarian intervention in Kosovo prompted discussion on the continued
suitability of the U.N. collective security framework in an era where human
rights go beyond mere abstract moral claims to having a universal (erga
omnes) character.4
The responsibility to protect (RtoP) doctrine, a set of principles
proposed in a 2001 report by the International Commission on Intervention
and State Sovereignty, attempted to inculcate within the U.N. a set of norms
that would guide the Council’s exercise of discretion.5 The authors of the
RtoP report noted that the Council “should deal promptly with any request
2

See generally THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL AND WAR: THE EVOLUTION OF THOUGHT
AND PRACTICE SINCE 1945 (Vaughn Lowe et al. eds., 2008).
3
See David D. Caron, The Legitimacy of the Collective Authority of the Security Council, 87 AM. J.
INT’L L. 552 (1993) (offering a systematic analysis of Council legitimacy); Martin Binder & Monika
Heupel, The Legitimacy of the UN Security Council: Evidence from Recent General Assembly Debates, 59
INT’L STUD. Q. 238 (2015); Ian Hurd, The UN Security Council and the International Rule of Law, 7
CHINESE J. INT’L POL. 361 (2014); Devon Whittle, The Limits of Legality and the United Nations Security
Council: Applying the Extra-Legal Measures Model to Chapter VII Action, 26 EUR. J. INT’L L. 671 (2015);
SIMON CHESTERMAN, THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE RULE OF LAW: FINAL REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE AUSTRIAN INITIATIVE 2004–2008 (2008), http://iilj.org/research/documents/
UNSC_and_the_Rule_of_Law.pdf.
4
Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), Judgment, 1970 I.C.J. Rep. 3, ¶ 33
(Feb. 5) (holding that basic rights of human persons are erga omnes). For criticism of Council inaction in
Rwanda, see Michael N. Barnett, The UN Security Council, Indifference, and Genocide in Rwanda, 12
CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 551 (1997); Linda Melvern, The Security Council: Behind the Scenes, 77
INT’L AFF. 101 (2001).
5
See generally INT’L COMM’N INTERVENTION AND ST. SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO
PROTECT: REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY
(2001) [hereinafter ICISS REPORT] (arguing that RtoP is enshrined in two key principles: 1) State
sovereignty implies responsibility, with the primary responsibility for the protection of a State’s people
vesting with the State itself; and 2) the non-intervention principle that underpins sovereignty yields to the
international responsibility to protect where a population is suffering serious harm due to State failure).
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for authority to intervene where there are allegations of large-scale loss of
human life or ethnic cleansing.”6 Further, in light of this changing landscape
there is growing state support for a code of conduct proposed by France,
which would require permanent members of the Council to voluntarily
abstain from using a veto in cases “involving mass atrocity crimes.” 7
Although RtoP has gained some traction within the U.N., the failure of the
Council to agree on a resolution to ease the humanitarian crisis in Syria has
provoked widespread condemnation amongst states, prompting the U.N.
General Assembly (Assembly) to pass a strongly worded resolution, by a
large majority, “deploring the failure of the Security Council.”8 In the field
of international justice, the Council has also been criticised for condoning
impunity given that it was deadlocked on both a referral to the ICC to
investigate the Syrian situation and also on the creation of an ad hoc tribunal
for the MH17 airline disaster. 9
While some may contend that the Council’s 2012 deadlock over Syria
stemmed from reasonable disagreement among the permanent members on
the appropriate course of action, the prospect of the Council returning to the
post-Cold War levels of cooperation that contributed to its functional
expansion remains far from certain. Not all permanent members
wholeheartedly share the view that the Council’s functions include the
regulation of human rights situations within a state, reflecting a conception
of security that prioritises national sovereignty over human rights. 10
Additionally, recent tensions among the permanent members over Russia’s
intervention in Crimea have provoked references to a “new Cold War,” a
view apparently most recently shared by Russian Prime Minister Dmitry

6

Id. at 50.
Meetings Coverage, Security Council, U.N. Speakers Call for Voluntary Suspension of Veto
Rights in Cases of Mass Atrocity Crimes, as Security Council Debates Working Methods, U.N. Meetings
Coverage SC/11164 (Oct. 29, 2013). During this meeting, representatives for the following states spoke in
support of France’s proposal: Australia, Chile, Germany, Hungary, Liechtenstein, Malaysia, Maldives
Mexico, Rwanda, Singapore, Slovenia, Switzerland, and Ukraine.
8
G.A. Res. 66/253 B, (Aug. 3, 2012) (133 votes to 12, with 31 abstentions) (emphasis added).
9
Meetings Coverage, Security Council, Referral of Syria to International Criminal Court Fails as
Negative Votes Prevent Security Council from Adopting Draft Resolution, U.N. Meetings Coverage
SC/11407 (May 22, 2014); U.N. SCOR, 70th Sess., 7498th mtg, U.N. Doc. S/PV.7498 (July 29, 2015). See
also Michael Ramsden, Uniting for MH17, ASIAN J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2016).
10
Alex J. Bellamy, The Responsibility to Protect Turns Ten, 29 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 161, 175–76
(2015). Non-permanent member votes are important, but permanent members are primus inter pares, thus
the most important focus for analysis on Council decision-making. David P. Forsythe, The U.N. Security
Council and Response to Atrocities: The P-5 and International Criminal Law, 34 HUM. RTS. Q. 840, 841
(2012).
7
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Medvedev. 11 Robert Legvold cautioned that these “new Cold War” tensions
“will affect nearly every important dimension of the international system.”12
Given the likelihood of Council deadlock in the future on serious human
rights abuses, it is necessary to evaluate the feasibility of invoking other
collective security mechanisms to alleviate such crises.
In this respect, there have been calls for the Assembly to make use of
the Uniting for Peace (UfP) resolution. 13 This resolution contemplates
Assembly action where, due to an absence of unanimity, the Council fails to
maintain international peace and security in the view of the Assembly. 14
The Assembly first invoked UfP to recommend the continuation of U.N.
action in Korea in 1950 following the Soviet Union’s veto of this mandate.
UfP has since been used to condemn acts of aggression and alien occupation,
to support peacekeeping operations, and to augment claims of a people to
self-determination, as with Palestine.15 In providing a basis for the Assembly
to assume an enhanced role in regulating international security, it may
therefore provide a solution in instances where the international community
supports a “humanitarian intervention” that is otherwise stymied by a
Council Member’s veto.
Still, uncertainties remain as to the continued relevance of UfP in a
world that has moved on since the end of the Cold War. From the
perspective of those who consider UfP obsolete in the modern era, the UfP
bore political relevance then precisely because it was a device for the
permanent members (mainly the United States) to enjoy collective
legitimacy for their actions when they were assured of support within the
11
See James Stavridis, Are We Entering a New Cold War?, FOREIGN POL’Y (Feb. 17, 2016),
http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/02/17/are-we-entering-a-new-cold-war-russia-europe/.
12
Robert Legvold, Managing the New Cold War, 93 FOREIGN AFF. 74, 75 (2014).
13
G.A. Res. 377 (V), (Nov. 3, 1950) (the Uniting for Peace (UfP) resolution). There have been calls
for the Assembly to invoke UfP in a variety of contexts, including the securing of accountability for mass
crimes. See, e.g., U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the
Gaza Conflict, ¶ 1971, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/12/48 (Sept. 24, 2009); Independent Fact Finding Committee on
Gaza to the League of Arab States, Report of the Independent Fact-Finding on Committee on Gaza: No
Safe Place, ¶ 610 (Apr. 30, 2009); U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Detailed Findings of the
Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, ¶¶ 362, 1201,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/25/CRP.1 (Feb. 7, 2014); U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent
International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, ¶ 139, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/28/69 (Feb. 5,
2015).
14
G.A. Res. 377 (V), supra note 13.
15
See Christina Binder, Uniting for Peace Resolution (1950), in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, ¶¶ 9–10 (Rudiger Wolfrum ed., 2006); Keith S. Petersen, The Uses of the
Uniting for Peace Resolution Since 1950, 13 INT’L ORG. 219 (1959).
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Assembly. Once the Assembly evolved to the point where it no longer
generated majorities that favoured Western states, UfP was no longer used in
the mainstream of U.N. practice. 16 Changes in international politics and
realignment of the balance of power would thus make UfP something of an
unpredictable mechanism, a “double-edged sword” for states that sponsored
such resolutions. 17 Furthermore, UfP is premised on the claim that
“something should be done,” but there remains the belief that international
security should not be overregulated, with the veto at least serving to ensure
selective intervention in this respect. 18
The Assembly of old was also differently composed than the one of
today, with much larger states and, arguably, a stronger capacity and
legitimacy to make decisions affecting international peace and security. 19
The process of decolonisation and self-determination has produced many
more states that in turn are able to vote in the Assembly, and to do so on an
equal basis irrespective of the material differences between states.20 As it
stands, China’s vote (representing a population of almost 1.3 billion) is
given equal weight to Tuvalu’s (representing a population of about 11,000)
in the Assembly. Although the difference in material capabilities of states
should have no bearing on the legitimacy of a state’s view on what
constitutes a human rights abuse, it may be relevant to the enforcement of
measures to address such abuse. The point here is that while the Council
may suffer from a number of defects, at least it attributes greater weight to

16

Andrew J. Carswell, Unblocking the Security Council: The Uniting for Peace Resolution, 18 J.
CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 453, 455–56 (2013).
17
Id.
18
See ADAM ROBERTS & DOMINIK ZAUM, SELECTIVE SECURITY: WAR AND THE UNITED NATIONS
SECURITY COUNCIL SINCE 1945 (2008).
19
The U.N. comprised 51 founding members in 1945; today it has 193 members, and all of them
have a vote in the Assembly. As to changes in voting in the Assembly, see Peter Ferdinand, Rising Powers
at the UN: An Analysis of the Voting Behaviour of BRICS in the General Assembly, 35 THIRD WORLD Q.
376 (2014); Nicolas Burmester & Michael Jankowski, The Unsolved Puzzle: Pacific Asia’s Voting
Cohesion in the United Nations General Assembly—A Response to Peter Ferdinand, 16 BRIT. J. POL. &
INT’L REL. 680 (2014); Michal Onderco, “Tell Me What You Want”: Analyzing the Visegrád Countries’
Votes in the UN General Assembly, 28 E. EUR. POL. & SOCIETIES 63 (2014); DIANA PANKE, UNEQUAL
ACTORS IN EQUALISING INSTITUTIONS: NEGOTIATIONS IN THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
(2013).
20
See U.N. Charter, art. 18(1) (“Each member of the General Assembly shall have one vote.”). As
to size disparities in the Assembly and how this impacts on voting, see Diana Panke, Is Bigger Better?
Activity and Success in Negotiations in the United Nations General Assembly, 30 NEGOT. J. 367 (2014).

272

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 25 NO. 2

the choices of bigger states who have the political and material capabilities
necessary to carry out the difficult role of managing international security. 21
It is therefore undeniable that the Assembly also suffers from a
number of shortcomings in terms of its ability to ensure that the U.N. adapts
to changing threats to international peace and security. Still, this article will
focus on the more fundamental legal question of whether the Assembly may
assume functions analogous to those of the Council in the event of deadlock.
While the success of this legal proposition will ultimately turn on its
application, which is inevitably a political choice, the following analysis
provides a sufficiently clear legal basis for UfP to facilitate broad support,
from large and small states alike, for the Assembly to assume an
extraordinary function in those circumstances where the Council has failed
to address serious human rights abuses. There are, admittedly, a number of
obstacles. Unlike the Council’s impressive powers, the Assembly is limited
to making “recommendations,” which, as the phrase suggests, carry no direct
legal effect. 22 Many still question the legal significance of the UfP
resolution and its contemporary impact on U.N. practice. 23 More still
challenge the notion that the Assembly’s resolutions are capable of binding
or authorising the membership to do that which would otherwise contravene
international law. 24 Given recent condemnations of the use of vetoes and
general uncertainty as to the continued application of UfP, a fresh analysis of
these legal issues that goes to the heart of the U.N. Charter’s division of
powers in maintaining international peace and security is warranted.
This article will consider the extent to which an Assembly resolution
could augment a “humanitarian intervention” pursuant to a U.N. mandate.
The focus on humanitarian intervention, involving the use of coercive force
to forestall a humanitarian crisis, has attracted controversy precisely because
it involves intervention without consent of the host State. 25 UfP practice
21

DAVID L. BOSCO, FIVE TO RULE THEM ALL: THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE MAKING OF THE
MODERN WORLD 19 (2009).
22
See U.N. Charter arts. 10–14.
23
Larry D. Johnson, “Uniting for Peace”: Does it Still Serve Any Useful Purpose?, AM. J. INT’L L.
UNBOUND (July 15, 2014), http://www.asil.org/blogs/“uniting-peace”-does-it-still-serve-any-usefulpurpose.
24
Stefan Talmon, The Legalizing and Legitimizing Function of UN General Assembly Resolutions,
AM. J. INT’L L. UNBOUND (July 18, 2014), http://www.asil.org/blogs/legalizing-and-legitimizing-functionun-general-assembly-resolutions.
25
Generally, “humanitarian intervention” is a concept used to describe the use of force outside of the
U.N. Charter, although some also use the phrase to describe instances of U.N. action that serve a
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regarding the deployment of forces, on the other hand, has generally
concerned the recommendation to U.N. members to participate in
peacekeeping operations that have occurred at the host State’s invitation,
thus removing some of the controversies associated with Assembly
recommendations made under UfP. 26 Furthermore, the focus on
humanitarian intervention here is prompted by the regular and periodic
assertions by governments in favour of a right to intervene outside of the
Charter framework in order to avert humanitarian crises. 27 For example,
large-scale human rights abuse in Syria provoked the British government to
argue in 2013 that the failure of the Council to act would justify unilateral
intervention based on a putative customary law exception to the use of
force. 28 While there are serious doubts as to the basis for unilateral
humanitarian intervention under custom, the question remains whether the
Assembly may perform an authorising function for any such coercive
intervention, such as to qualify it as enforcement action under the U.N.
Charter.
Accordingly, this article will test the constitutional authority of the
Assembly to authorise humanitarian intervention. Grounded in a
teleological interpretation of the U.N. Charter and UfP practice, it will argue,
provided the political will exists, that the Assembly may perform such a
function. The Assembly is able to do this because the U.N. Charter permits
a broad approach to implied powers and the imperfect observance of formal
provisions where the assumption of power by this organ furthers the
purposes of the U.N. This interpretation of the Charter is apparent not only
from the reasoning of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) but also from
the practice and relations of the principal U.N. organs, particularly the
Assembly and Council, since 1945. A historical survey of UfP practice also
supports the Assembly’s authority to take enforcement action in
extraordinary circumstances.
humanitarian purpose. See Carrie Booth Walling, Human Rights Norms, State Sovereignty, and
Humanitarian Intervention, 37 HUM. RTS. Q. 383 (2015).
26
See Binder, supra note 15; infra Part II(A)(1) (describing the uses of UfP).
27
For a survey of recent arguments, see generally FABIAN KLOSE, THE EMERGENCE OF
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION (2015); Juan Carlos de la Cuevas, Exceptional Measures Call for
Exceptional Times: The Permissibility Under International Law of Humanitarian Intervention To Protect a
People’s Right to Self-Determination, 37 HOUST. J. INT’L L. 491 (2015).
28
Prime Minister’s Off., Policy Paper: Chemical Weapon Use by Syrian Regime: UK Government
Legal Position (Aug. 29, 2013), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/chemical-weapon-use-bysyrian-regime-uk-government-legal-position/chemical-weapon-use-by-syrian-regime-uk-government-legalposition-html-version [hereinafter Chemical Weapon Use by Syrian Regime]
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The necessary starting point for analysing the scope of the Assembly’s
authority to authorise the use of force is Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter,
which prohibits members from using force against another state. 29 If the
state in which a humanitarian crisis exists does not consent to outside
intervention, then it is necessary to establish an exception to the use of force
prohibition.30 While there is reasoned disagreement on the scope of Article
2(4), consensus exists on two Charter-based exceptions. 31 First, under
Article 51, states may act individually or collectively in self-defence if an
“armed attack” occurs. Second, the Council may take military enforcement
action under Chapter VII upon finding that there is a “threat to the peace,
breach of the peace, or act of aggression.” 32
A humanitarian crisis does not qualify as an “armed attack” directed
against a state; this term is defined by the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
as requiring a cross-border incursion involving military force of a particular
intensity. 33 Humanitarian crises mostly occur within states rather than across
borders; a mass exodus of refugees also does not constitute an armed attack,
given that it does not involve the use of armed force that can be attributed to
29
For a thorough treatment on the scope of the use of force principle under Article 2(4), see THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Marc Weller et al. eds., 2015). See
also Thomas M. Franck & Nigel S. Rodley, After Bangladesh: The Law of Humanitarian Intervention by
Military Force, 67 AM. J. INT’L L. 275, 285 (1973) (arguing that there are only limited circumstances in
which force can be used under the U.N. Charter).
30
See Ashley S. Deeks, Consent to the Use of Force and International Law Supremacy, 54 HARV.
INT’L L.J. 1 (2013) (analysing the consent principle and the extent to which it precludes international
responsibility).
31
Some have argued that the text of Article 2(4) itself only precludes the use of force that affects the
“territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
purposes of the United Nations Charter.” On this permissive view, for instance, armed force that has the
sole purpose to prevent human rights abuse, or to protect nationals abroad, or as reprisals for prior breaches
of international law, would not violate Article 2(4). However, this permissive view is inconsistent with the
Charter’s travaux preparatoires, which indicated that the inclusion of this phrase was intended to
strengthen the prohibition rather than to create exceptions to it. Furthermore, reference to “territorial
integrity or political independence” is more of a reference to the totality of statehood rather than limiting
the prohibitive scope of Article 2(4). Finally, the restrictive interpretation of Article 2(4) is reinforced in
subsequent State practice, as reflected in the Assembly’s declaration in Resolution 2625. G.A. Res. 2625
(XXV) (Oct. 24, 1970) (“No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for
any reason whatsoever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State. Consequently, armed
intervention and all other forms of interference or attempted threats against the personality of the State or
against its political, economic and cultural elements, are in violation of international law.”). See also
STEPHEN HALL, FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 481–82 (2012).
32
U.N. Charter art. 39.
33
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986
I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 195 (June 27).
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a State.34 Therefore, the use of force to avert a humanitarian crisis does not
fall within the right to self-defence, and thus a Chapter VII authorisation is
required. If the Council determines that human rights abuse within a state
constitutes a “threat to the peace” and authorises enforcement action, then a
“humanitarian intervention” is permitted. 35 The Council has used its
Chapter VII powers for humanitarian purposes; the imposition of no-fly
zones in Iraq in 1991 is a notable early example.36 Accordingly, a Council
authorisation justifies what would otherwise be an unlawful use of force.37
However, actual or anticipated Council deadlock on grave
humanitarian situations has led states to assert a legal basis for intervention
outside the Charter framework. 38 The humanitarian intervention doctrine
was most recently asserted by Britain in response to the use of chemical
weapons against civilian populations in Syria in 2013. The British Prime
Minister argued that intervention would be lawful provided it was necessary,
proportionate to the aim of relief of humanitarian need, and supported by
evidence of “extreme humanitarian distress on a large scale.”39 Even in the
absence of Council authorisation, it “would still be permitted under
international law to take exceptional measures in order to alleviate the scale
of the overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe in Syria.” 40 The legality of
this proposition turns on whether Article 2(4) is a comprehensive prohibition
on the use of force.41 The length of this article precludes a detailed analysis

34
Bruno Simma, NATO, The U.N. and the Use Of Force: Legal Aspects, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1, 5
(1999). In Nicaragua v. United States, in defining “armed attack,” the ICJ drew from the Definition of
Aggression annexed to Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXII): “[I]t may be considered to be agreed that an
armed attack must be understood as including not merely action by regular armed forces across an
international border, but also ‘the sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or
mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as to amount to’
(inter alia) an actual armed attack conducted by regular forces, ‘or its substantial involvement therein.’”
Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J., supra note 33, at ¶ 195 (quoting Article 3, paragraph (g) of the Definition of
Aggression annexed to Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXII).
35
C.J. Apperley & Ian Brownlie, Kosovo Crisis Inquiry: Memorandum on the International Law
Aspects, 49 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 878, 894, 904 (2000).
36
S.C. Res. 688 (Apr. 5, 1991).
37
See generally DANESH SAROOSHI, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF COLLECTIVE
SECURITY (1999).
38
See Nigel Rodley, Humanitarian Intervention, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE USE OF FORCE
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 775, 775–96 (Marc Weller ed., 2015) [hereinafter Rodley, Humanitarian
Intervention] (providing an analysis of state practice).
39
Chemical Weapon Use by Syrian Regime, supra note 28. See also Johnson, supra note 23.
40
Id.
41
Carsten Stahn, Between Law-Breaking and Law-Making: Syria, Humanitarian Intervention and
“What The Law Ought To Be,” 19 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 25, 33 (2013).
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here of the competing positions, but strong arguments militate against
humanitarian intervention outside of the Charter framework.
Specifically, there is little evidence showing that the humanitarian
intervention doctrine has matured into custom, which requires state practice
that is “extensive and virtually uniform” together with opinio juris.42 The
few examples cited to show state acquiescence to the putative norm’s
formation are equivocal and may easily be justified on alternative legal
bases. For example, the interventions of India in East Pakistan (1971),
Vietnam in Cambodia (1978), and Tanzania in Uganda (1979) each brought
an end to serious human rights abuses, but the basis for the interventions was
hotly contested and the intervening states prevaricated about their legal
justifications. 43 Similarly, the NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999 did
not precipitate a change in custom. 44 The acceptance of the responsibility to
protect doctrine (RtoP) and international criminal law bolstered the case for
unilateral humanitarian intervention as a customary norm. 45
It is true that RtoP derives from the same normative root as the
humanitarian intervention doctrine: both are concerned with protecting
civilian populations from serious human rights abuses. But RtoP supports
U.N. collective security rather than challenging it. The Assembly’s 2005
adoption of the World Summit Outcome Document affirms RtoP action
through the Council: it recognises that the international community is
“prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through
the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII,
on a case-by-case basis . . . [where] national authorities are manifestly
failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic
cleansing and crimes against humanity.” 46 Similarly, the emergence of
international criminal law only supports the case for post-conflict
accountability. It is possible to conceive of accountability for atrocities as a
42
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany (F.R.G) v. Den.; F.R.G v.
Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. Rep. 3, ¶ 74 (Feb. 20).
43
See generally Franck & Rodley, supra note 29.
44
Apperley & Brownlie, supra note 35, at 904.
45
Daniel Bethlehem, Stepping Back a Moment—The Legal Basis in Favour of a Principle of
Humanitarian Intervention, EJIL TALK! BLOG EUR. J. INT’L L. (Sept. 12 2013), http://www.ejiltalk.org/
stepping-back-a-moment-the-legal-basis-in-favour-of-a-principle-of-humanitarian-intervention.
46
G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶ 139 (Sept. 16, 2005) (emphasis added). The same paragraph also notes rather
generally the Assembly’s role under RtoP: “We stress the need for the General Assembly to continue
consideration of the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and
crimes against humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and international
law.” Id.
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multi-staged process, including humanitarian intervention and international
criminal law, but the two have developed along quite different legal paths.
While international criminal law has advanced with the support of
multilateral treaties (e.g., the Rome Statute) and Chapter VII powers
(notably, establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda), the
humanitarian intervention doctrine is lacking in “extensive and virtually
uniform” acceptance of its customary status.47
The principal concern about the doctrine is that it will be abused; that
risk might be alleviated were the Assembly, acting under the Uniting for
Peace Resolution (UfP), to assume an authorising function. 48 The character
of the Assembly as a multilateral forum could assuage concerns that
humanitarian intervention is premised on the unilateral assessment of selfinterested states. While these concerns will always persist regardless of
forum, there is at least the prospect that a humanitarian intervention
authorised by the U.N.’s general membership in a consensual process would
confer legality and legitimacy on the operation. Indeed, it is indicative that
Britain and the United States chose to pursue action in Kosovo through
NATO instead of invoking UfP, perhaps because of the political risk that the
resolution might fail. 49 Those States perhaps chose to maintain the
intervention’s putative legitimacy, despite its questionable legality. Still, in
the event of a veto being exercised in the Council, the Assembly provides a
suitable alternative multilateral forum in which to authorise humanitarian
intervention, provided the political will exists.
The use of UfP as a basis for humanitarian intervention lacks precedent but
is not without supporters. During the conflict in Kosovo in the late 1990s,
Canada considered using UfP to gain authorisation for the NATO action.50
At that time, scholars recognised the validity of the 1950 resolution as a
basis for the Assembly to act where a Council resolution was blocked and
47

See F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth., 1969 I.C.J., supra note 42, at ¶ 77 (Feb. 20) (explaining the
classic formulation for establishing custom).
48
See Group of 77 Summit in Havana, Cuba: Declaration of the South Summit, ¶ 54 (Apr. 10–14,
2000), http://www.g77.org/Docs/Declaration_G77Summit.htm (containing criticisms composed by the
Group of 77, a coalition of southern nations). See also Mohammed Ayoob, Third World Perspectives on
Humanitarian Intervention and International Administration, 10 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 99 (2004).
49
Nigel White, Relationship Between the Security Council and General Assembly, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 293, 306 (Marc Weller et al. eds., 2015)
[hereinafter White, Relationship Between].
50
Paul Heinbecker, Kosovo, in THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL: FROM THE COLD WAR TO THE 21ST
CENTURY 537, 543 (David Malone ed., 2004).
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suggested that humanitarian intervention could be appropriate under UfP.51
The major issue, however, is whether the Assembly is able to assume the
Council’s function in authorising forcible coercive measures. During the
Kosovo crisis some British officials appeared to doubt the use of UfP to
effectuate a humanitarian intervention, partly because an Assembly
resolution cannot equate to a Chapter VII authorisation. 52 It is therefore
critical to determine whether the Assembly possesses the constitutional
power to authorise such coercive action.
A.

Coercive Measures and the Uniting for Peace Resolution

In the text of the U.N. Charter, only the Council is empowered to take
forcible coercive measures. 53 By contrast, the Assembly’s function is
essentially deliberative—it may “discuss,” “promote,” and “recommend.”54
Unlike Council decisions, an Assembly recommendation does not bind the
membership, unless pertaining to internal operational matters, such as
admission of U.N. members or budget apportionment.55 Given the hortatory
nature of the Assembly’s express powers, in stark contrast to the coercive
powers attributed to the Council, it must be analysed how the Assembly is
able to authorise a humanitarian intervention. A starting point for this
analysis is the relevant text from the UfP resolution, which was passed
following growing frustration over Council inaction, most notably with
respect to the deadlock on the continuation of the U.N. mandate in Korea in
1950. The UfP resolution provides in its relevant part:
Resolves that if the Security Council, because of lack of
unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its
primary responsibility for the maintenance of international
peace and security in any case where there appears to be a
51

See Apperley & Brownlie, supra note 35, at 904 (“The argument that a resolution would have
been ‘blocked’ by Russia and/or China is unattractive, in part because the matter could then have been
taken to the U.N. General Assembly (in a Special Emergency Session) on the basis of the Uniting for Peace
Resolution of 1950. Presumably the NATO States had no hope of obtaining a two-thirds majority in the
General Assembly.”).
52
See, e.g., HOUSE OF COMMONS FOREIGN AFF. COMM., MINUTES OF EVIDENCE, 1999, HC 28-II, ¶
63–64 (UK), http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm199900/cmselect/cmfaff/28/ 9111
818.htm (Statement by Mr. Emyr Jones Parry); HOUSE OF COMMONS, FOURTH REPORT OF THE SELECT
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 2000, HC 28-II, ¶ 128 (UK), http://www.parliament.the-stationeryoffice.co.uk/pa/cm 199900/cmselect /cmfaff/28/2813.htm#a35.
53
U.N. Charter art. 42.
54
Id. arts. 11–17, 55.
55
South West Africa Cases (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.) (Second Phase), Judgment, 1966 I.C.J.
Rep. 6, 50–51 (July 18).
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threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the
General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a
view to making appropriate recommendations to Members for
collective measures, including in the case of a breach of the
peace or act of aggression the use of armed force when
necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and
security. 56
During the discussion of the UfP resolution, Assembly members advanced
many arguments for and against the resolution, including its precise scope.
Opposing interpretations of the U.N. Charter were used to prove the
assertions of each side.57 From this, and subsequent practice, there are two
competing theories on the resolution’s scope. The first is that the
“recommendations to members for collective measures” only reflects the
Assembly’s deliberative functions; such a recommendation has no legal
significance and members have no duty to follow it. The recommendation
would not make lawful what is otherwise an unlawful use of force. For
brevity, this theory is labelled “weak UfP.” By contrast, “strong UfP”
theory asserts that the Assembly may recommend that members take
enforcement action. While such a recommendation is not binding on the
membership, it serves to authorise states to use force in accordance with a
U.N. mandate. In the following parts of this article, the basic features of
these two theories will be outlined. This article will then advance the claim
that the U.N.’s constitutional structure is such that the Assembly can assume
enforcement powers to authorise a humanitarian intervention under a U.N.
mandate.
1.

“Weak UfP”

According to weak UfP, the Assembly cannot authorise force because
the resolution only recognises the ability of the Assembly to act concurrently
with the Council to discuss and make non-binding recommendations to U.N.
members. This assertion of power was made despite Article 12(1), which
forbids the Assembly from making recommendations with respect to a
dispute or situation where the Council is still exercising its functions. In its
Advisory Opinion Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory the ICJ observed that decades of practice
56
57

G.A. Res. 377 (V), supra note 13 (emphasis added).
See J. Andrassy, Uniting for Peace, 50 AM. J. INT’L L. 563 (1956).
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have modified Article 12(1) to permit the Assembly to act concurrently with
the Council, even where the Council was deliberating on a situation
implicating international peace and security. 58 However, the constitutional
significance of UfP should not be overstated. That the Assembly may
recommend the use of armed force should be interpreted within the Charter
framework and general international law. 59 In particular, Article 2(4)
prohibits U.N. members from using force, subject to the exceptions of selfdefence and Chapter VII authorisations. An Assembly recommendation is
not acknowledged as a possible exception to Article 2(4), which undermines
any supposed permissive effect of an Assembly recommendation to use
force.
The ability to take coercive action is exclusively vested in the
Council. 60 Pursuant to Article 11, if the Assembly forms a view on the need
to use force, it should convey a recommendation to the Council for
“enforcement action.” 61 The text of UfP confirms the Assembly’s limited
role, in that it suggests that the Assembly may only make a recommendation
in the case of a “breach of the peace, or act of aggression.”62 In the context
of weak UfP, the terms “breach of the peace” or “act of aggression” are
equated to an armed attack by one state against another. 63 An Assembly
recommendation to use force is thus a simple declaration of the right to selfdefence.64
UfP practice also provides some support for the Assembly’s limited
role. The ICJ’s Advisory Opinion Certain Expenses of the United Nations
distinguished an Assembly-mandated peacekeeping operation (premised on
host state’s consent) from an “enforcement action” under Chapter VII, the
58
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory
Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. Rep. 136, ¶ 27 (July 9). The ICJ’s finding on Article 12(1) was primarily based on the
conclusion that the Assembly’s request for an advisory opinion was not a “recommendation.” Id. ¶¶ 49,
51–54.
59
See Gerald Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice, 1951–4:
Questions of Jurisdiction, Competence and Procedure, 34 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 1, 5 (1958).
60
See G.A. Res. 60/286, ¶ 1 (Oct. 9, 2006) (acknowledging the Council’s primary responsibility for
peace and security).
61
U.N. Charter art. 11.
62
G.A. Res. 377 (V), supra note 13.
63
YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE § 906 (5th ed. 2011).
64
See Christian Tomuschat, Uniting for Peace, United Nations Audiovisual Library of International
Law 3 (2008), http://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/ufp/ufp_e.pdf. See also Dominik Zaum, The Security Council,
the General Assembly, and War: The Uniting for Peace Resolution, in THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY
COUNCIL AND WAR, supra note 2, at 154, 171.
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latter being the Council’s exclusive preserve. 65 Furthermore, that the
Assembly acting under UfP asked the Council to take action in a number of
situations underlines the Council’s exclusive role in authorising coercive
measures by states. 66
Practice according to weak UfP is interpreted as reinforcing the jus ad
bellum justifications of self-defence or host state consent and not coercive
action. Identifying practice is ambiguous given that relevant subsequent
resolutions do not always cite the UfP resolution, but some conclusions may
be drawn nonetheless. 67 The Assembly’s reaction to the Council’s
withdrawal of support for the Republic of Korea during the 1950s is an
example where UfP may have provided justification for Assembly action
even though it was not cited. The 1950 U.N. Council Resolution on Korea
concerned an attack by forces from North Korea on the Republic of
Korea. The Council characterised this as an armed attack and “breach of the
peace,” recommending “that Members of the United Nations furnish such
assistance to the Republic of Korea.” 68 Following a Soviet veto on the
continuation of the U.N. mission, the Assembly passed Resolution 498(V),
which called on states to “lend every assistance to the United Nations action
in Korea.” 69 Here, “every assistance” suggests a continuation of the
Council’s recommendation to assist South Korea to repel an armed attack. 70
The same justification underpins the Assembly’s condemnation in
Resolution ES-8/1, which noted South Africa’s “unprovoked massive armed
aggression against Angola,” calling on the “international community to
provide ‘military assistance’ to ‘front line States in order to defend their
sovereignty’. . . against renewed acts of aggression by South Africa.”71
Resolutions under UfP have also been based on host state consent.
The power of the Peace Observation Commission, established to report on
situations where tension exists, is dependent on the consent of the state into
whose territory it enters. 72 Similarly, the Assembly created various
65

Certain Expenses of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1962 I.C.J. Rep. 151 (July 20).
See, e.g., G.A. Res. 8/2, ¶ 12 (Sept. 14, 1981) (illustrating the Assembly asked the Council to
impose sanctions on South Africa for its continued occupation of Namibia).
67
Binder, supra note 15, § 9.
68
S.C. Res. 83 (June 27, 1950).
69
G.A. Res. 498 (V), ¶ 4 (Feb. 1, 1951).
70
Johnson, supra note 23.
71
G.A. Res. 8/2, supra note 66, at ¶ 7.
72
U.N. Secretary-General, Summary Study of the Experience Derived from the Establishment and
Operation of the Force, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. A/3943 (Oct. 9, 1958).
66
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peacekeeping missions with a consensual foundation, for instance
recommending members to “assist” the Congo in upholding “law and
order.”73 The consensual foundation of the UfP is what ensured its broad
support within the Assembly during the Cold War. Thus, it was only
because Egypt consented to the deployment of the United Nations
Emergency Force (UNEF) on its territory that the Soviet Union abstained in
the Assembly rather than opposing the force’s establishment.74
2.

“Strong UfP”

According to strong UfP theory, the purposes underpinning the U.N.
Charter enable the Assembly to authorise coercive measures where the
Council has failed to discharge its primary responsibility to the collective
security community. Pursuant to Article 1(1), a key purpose of the U.N
Charter is to maintain international peace and security through “collective
measures.” 75 Article 1(1) does not specify which entity is to engage in
collective measures—peace and security are underpinnings of the U.N.
Charter writ large and not just the functions of the Council.76 Under Article
24, “Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the
maintenance of peace and security.” 77 The term “primary responsibility”
implies that secondary responsibility falls on the Assembly, given that it is
the only organ within the U.N. that represents all members (and thus is the
collective that conditionally confers power on the Council). As the ICJ in
Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Certain Expenses) observed, the
U.N. Charter makes it “abundantly clear” that the Assembly is also
concerned with international peace and security. 78 That the Assembly may
recommend “measures” under Article 14 for the peaceful adjustment of any
situation itself “implies some kind of action.”79 The overarching purpose of

73

G.A. Res. 1474 (ES-IV), ¶ 2 (Sept. 17–19, 1960).
ROSALYN HIGGINS, UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING 1946–1967: DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY
262 (1969).
75
U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶1.
76
See, e.g., G.A. Res. ES-7/7 (Aug. 19, 1982) (explaining the General Assembly is “[d]eeply aware
of the responsibility of the United Nations under its Charter for the maintenance of international peace”)
(emphasis added).
77
U.N Charter, art. 24, ¶ 1.
78
Certain Expenses of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1962 I.C.J. Rep. 151 (July 20).
79
Id.
74
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the U.N. thus provides the Assembly with the power to recommend
enforcement measures where the Council is deadlocked.80
Still, Article 11(2) directs the Assembly to refer any question where
“action” is necessary to the Council. Certain Expenses may be interpreted
under weak UfP theory as showing that only the Council may authorise
coercive action. However, in that case the ICJ was referring to the Council
having a monopoly on mandatory coercive action, defined as being a
decision binding on the U.N. membership, for instance to contribute
forces.81 The ICJ stated that the Council may “order coercive action.”82 By
contrast, where the Assembly recommends action, it does not bind U.N.
members. 83 Accordingly, the voluntary peacekeeping force in Certain
Expenses did not constitute Council “action.” 84 Crucially, then, the ICJ
opinion envisages members contributing voluntarily to U.N. “action”
occurring outside of a Chapter VII mandate. Furthermore, this reading is
consistent with the view, as expressed by Judge Lauterpacht, that Assembly
recommendations may “on proper occasions” provide a “legal authorisation”
for members to act on them. 85 While Judge Lauterpacht did not elaborate
further on this statement, the authorising function of Assembly resolutions is
bound to be context-specific, based on the acceptance of strong UfP and the
Council’s failure to maintain international security.
The scope of the use of force prohibition in the U.N. Charter is also
instructive. The Assembly is not subject to this prohibition, which binds “all
Members” by contrast to the “Organization.” 86 Article 2 distinguishes
between Organization and Members, with subparagraph (4) only referring to

80

See Nigel D. White, From Korea to Kuwait: The Legal Basis of United Nations’ Military Action,
20 THE INT’L HIST. REV. 597, 603 (1998) [hereinafter White, From Korea to Kuwait] (explaining that it
was contemplated the Council members would act, to use President Roosevelt’s phrase, as “trustees” for
the international community. Although this is not used as a legal term of art, the point was that Council
decision-making was supposed to serve the international community rather than the national interests of
Council members).
81
NIGEL WHITE, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS 78 (2d ed. 2005).
82
Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962 I.C.J., supra note 65.
83
Kay Hailbronner & Eckart Klein, Functions & Powers: Article 10, in THE CHARTER OF THE
UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 226, 237–38 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 1995).
84
Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962 I.C.J., supra note 65.
85
Voting Procedure on Questions Relating to Reports and Petitions Concerning the Territory of
South-West Africa, Advisory Opinion, 1955 I.C.J. Rep. 115 (June 7) (separate opinion by Lauterpacht, J.).
86
U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4.
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“Members” when stating the prohibition. 87 Therefore, the salient issue is
whether acts of members pursuant to an Assembly resolution may be
attributed to the U.N. so as to fall outside of Article 2(4). It is well
recognised that U.N. organs may delegate their power to subsidiary bodies.88
Indeed, in Certain Expenses the ICJ did not question the constitutional
foundation of peacekeeping operations in the Congo and Suez, even though
their powers were directly or tacitly supported by Assembly resolutions.89
Furthermore, the Collective Measures Committee, a subsidiary organ
established under UfP, noted that “in the event of a decision or
recommendation of the United Nations to undertake collective measures . . .
States should not be subjected to legal liabilities under treaties or other
international agreements as a consequence of carrying out United Nations
collective measures.”90 As a subsidiary organ tasked with giving effect to
UfP, this statement is strong evidence as to the legal nature of
recommendations under this mechanism, placing Assembly-mandated
military action within the Charter framework and thus not subject to Article
2(4).
Still, it is necessary to establish that a delegation of authority is valid.
The delegator must not exceed its own authority, and must expressly and
specifically prescribe the power being delegated, retain “overall authority
and control,” and have the ability to rescind the delegated power. 91 The
most pertinent requirement here is that the delegation must not exceed the
delegator’s own authority. Given the admittedly deliberative functions of
the Assembly, such a delegation to use force is based on teleological
reasoning. The constitutional justification for a teleological construction of
the U.N. Charter is explored in Part II(B) below, but it suffices to note that
this interpretive basis for delegated powers is not unprecedented. As the ICJ
noted in Certain Expenses, the Council may decide to take enforcement
action even though a necessary requirement for such decision, Article 43
agreements, did not come into effect.92 The dilemma faced by the Council,
therefore, was that it would have been unable to give effect to its resolutions
given the unavailability of a standing U.N. force. The solution was to treat
87
U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4 (“All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”) (emphasis added).
88
See D.W. BOWETT ET AL., UNITED NATIONS FORCES: A LEGAL STUDY 299–301 (2008).
89
Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962 I.C.J., supra note 65.
90
U.N. GAOR, 6th Sess., Supp. 13, 33, U.N. Doc. A/1891 (1951). See also Talmon, supra note 24.
91
SAROOSHI, supra note 37, at 34.
92
Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962 I.C.J., supra note 65.
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Council resolutions as an authorisation for states to intervene under a U.N
mandate pursuant to the resolution. There is now no disputing the Council’s
ability to delegate enforcement action despite lacking textual support in the
U.N. Charter; this authorisation mechanism has been used to legally support
intervention in a number of situations in places such as Kuwait, Haiti, East
Timor, Sierra Leone, and Somalia, to name a few.93 Furthermore, that there
exists a distinction between a Council “decision” and an Assembly
“recommendation” does not alter the conclusion that the Assembly is able to
delegate authority. 94 In the absence of Article 43 agreements, to establish a
standing U.N. force, the Council may only recommend that U.N. members
contribute toward a Chapter VII operation. 95 Whether the delegation takes
place in a non-binding recommendation or by decision is of no legal
consequence—such recommendations are sufficient to delegate Chapter VII
authority to willing states.96
B.

Constructing the Assembly’s Powers Under the U.N. Charter

Whether the Assembly is ultimately able to recommend coercive
measures will depend on resolving the conflict between the doctrines of
attributed and implied powers. Whereas weak UfP has textual support in the
U.N. Charter, strong UfP relies more broadly on the teleological argument
that the U.N. should effectively ensure and maintain international peace and
security.
1.

Teleological Interpretation and Implied Powers in the U.N. Charter

The attributed powers doctrine prescribes that an organ may only
perform actions authorised by U.N. members. 97 Powers not expressly
conferred are the result of intentional omissions, which must be respected.98
By contrast, the implied powers doctrine, underpinned by teleological
interpretation, permits an organ to assume powers that are essential to, or in
93

Niels Blokker, Is the Authorization Authorized? Powers and Practice of the UN Security Council
to Authorize the Use of Force by “Coalitions of the Able and Willing”, 11 EUR. J. INT’L L. 541, 543 (2000).
94
See Marko Divac Öberg, The Legal Effects of Resolutions of the UN Security Council and General
Assembly in the Jurisprudence of the ICJ, 16 EUR. J. OF INT’L L. 879, 880 (2005) (discussing the
differences between decisions and recommendations).
95
SAROOSHI, supra note 37, at 149; DINSTEIN, supra note 63, § 887.
96
SAROOSHI, supra note 37, at 149; DINSTEIN, supra note 63, § 887.
97
For an analysis on the differences between attributed and implied powers doctrines, see Viljam
Engstrom, Reasoning on Powers of Organizations, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 56–83 (Jan Klabbers & Åsa Wallendahl eds., 2011).
98
JAN KLABBERS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS LAW 63 (2015).
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furtherance of, the organisation’s functioning. 99 These implied powers
might arise (narrowly) from the stated provisions or (broadly) from the
general purposes of the organisation and the needs of the international
community. 100
Methods of treaty interpretation are therefore central to determining
the scope of the Assembly’s powers. The U.N. Charter does not set out
specific rules on interpretation, making analysis of general principles
necessary. Article 33 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
(VCLT) instructs that a treaty should be interpreted in accordance “with the
ordinary meaning . . . and in light of its object and purpose.” 101 This
provision reflects a compromise of sorts between a textual and teleological
approach, although the primacy given to the text may limit the scope of a
teleological interpretation where it undermines the ordinary meaning of a
word.102 The VCLT provides a useful framework for “ordinary” treaties, but
as Sands and Klein noted, treaties establishing international organisations
warrant special treatment. 103 This is so with the U.N. Charter, a treaty
possessing a constitutional character: a universal and comprehensive
mandate, representing the international community and containing certain
hierarchical elements. 104 The U.N. Charter should therefore be subject to
different rules of interpretation having regard to the “intrinsically
evolutionary nature of a constitution.”105
The adoption of a teleological approach adheres to interpretive norms
and is established in ICJ jurisprudence as central to the U.N.’s dynamic
constitutional order. In Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of
the Nations Advisory Opinion (Reparations), the ICJ found that “[u]nder
international law, the Organisation must be deemed to have those powers
which, though not expressly provided in the Charter, are conferred upon it
99
Dapo Akande, The Competence of International Organizations and the Advisory Jurisdiction of
the ICJ, 9 EUR. J. INT’L L. 437, 445 (1998).
100
Id.
101
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 33, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
102
Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/191, at 218 (1966) (noting the tension in Article 33, but observing that the majority of jurists
preferred a primacy of the text approach).
103
PHILIPPE SANDS & PIERRE KLEIN, BOWETT’S LAW OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 454 (6th ed.
2009).
104
Sabine von Schorlemer, The United Nations, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 466, 474 (Jan Klabbers & Åsa Wallendahl eds., 2011).
105
OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 1268 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992);
Certain Expenses of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1962 I.C.J. Rep. 151 (July 20).
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by necessary implication, as being essential to the performance of its
duties.” 106 From the ICJ’s point of view, the U.N. should be effective in
achieving its objectives. The ICJ’s position is further underpinned in Effect
of Awards of Compensation Made by the United Nations Administrative
Tribunal, where the court found that the Assembly was competent to
establish an employment tribunal despite lacking the express powers to do
so. 107 The doctrine of implied powers was broadly articulated in Certain
Expenses, where the ICJ stated that “when the Organization takes action
which warrants the assertion that it was appropriate for the fulfilment of one
of the stated purposes of the United Nations, the presumption is that such
action is not ultra vires the Organization.” 108 The ICJ disavowed a literal
interpretation of the U.N. Charter where doing so left the U.N. “impotent in
the face of an emergency situation.” 109 What is remarkable here is the
distinction drawn between purposes and powers: an asserted power that is
rationally connected to a purpose of the U.N. will be lawful. The creation of
a peacekeeping force, furthering international security, even without any
textual support in the U.N. Charter, was thus intra vires.110
However, a more recent ICJ advisory opinion concerning the
competencies of the World Health Organization (WHO) suggests a departure
from these earlier functionalist interpretations. In Legality of the Use by a
State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, the ICJ noted that international
organisations do not possess a general competence, but are governed by the
“‘principle of specialty,’ that is to say, they are invested by the States which
create them with the powers, the limits of which are a function of the
common interests of promotion those States entrust to them.” 111 The
principle of specialty is synonymous with the attribution principle. 112
Accordingly, the WHO lacked the competence to consider the legality of
nuclear weapons, as this question was “immaterial” to the WHO’s
106
Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. Rep.
174, 182 (Apr. 11).
107
Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by the United Nations Administrative Tribunal,
Advisory Opinion, 1954 I.C.J. Rep. 47, 57 (July 13).
108
Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962 I.C.J., supra note 65.
109
Id. at 61.
110
See also Nigel White, The UN Charter and Peacekeeping Forces: Constitutional Issues, in THE
UN, PEACE AND FORCE, 42, 46 (Michael Pugh ed., 1996).
111
Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict (Request by the World
Health Organization), Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. Rep. 66, 78 (July 8).
112
HENRY G. SCHERMERS & NIELS M. BLOKKER, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW: UNITY
WITHIN DIVERSITY 158 (rev. 5th ed. 2011).
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functioning. 113 This reflects Judge Hackworth’s dissent in Reparations,
which states that “powers not expressed cannot freely be implied [but must]
flow from a grant of express powers.”114
Although a narrow approach may be applied to specialised agencies
like the WHO, this approach is not applicable to the U.N.’s principal
organs.115 The reasoning in Certain Expenses shows a liberal approach with
respect to powers that are used to further peace and security, over which the
Assembly has broad competence under Articles 11 and 12 of the U.N.
Charter. 116 Indeed, the broad competencies and membership of the
Assembly are incomparable to that of a specialised agency such as the
WHO. 117 Therefore, it is apparent that the preponderance of judicial
authority favours a broad approach to the implied powers of principal
organs, where doing so furthers a purpose of the U.N.
This broad approach is not only borne out in the courtroom, but also
in the practice of other U.N. organs. Realisation of the U.N. Charter’s
purposes has required the redistribution of powers between the U.N.’s
principal organs and thus the imperfect observance of the formal power
divisions in the Charter. 118 This reflects the accepted position that the U.N.
Charter is a “living” instrument, providing justification for procedural
latitude in giving effect to subsequent practice.119 Accordingly, U.N. organs
have assumed an increasingly broad array of powers to address new
international security challenges. 120 This has led the Council to assume
functions of the Assembly, and as evident from UfP, vice-versa. The
phenomena of “legislative” resolutions provides a good example of how the
Council has assumed a standard-setting function (traditionally the
Assembly’s function), thereby bypassing the slower processes of customary
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law formation to imbue broadly worded resolutions with the force to bind
the entire U.N. membership. 121
Such changes are possible because of the essentially “decentralized”
nature of the U.N. 122 Questions as to permissible constitutional limits are
most acute in legal systems where a supreme, impartial organ is able to
render an authoritative decision on the division of powers within an
international organisation. The U.N., on the other hand, is comprised of
organs that are co-equals, with none formally possessing the power of
authoritative interpretation. 123 Further, the Council does not possess the
legal authority to control acts of the Assembly. 124 The Council may seek to
pass a resolution objecting to any assertion of legal power made by the
Assembly, but the prospect of this passing turns on it having the support of
all permanent members. However, the political reality remains that the
Assembly is only ever likely to recommend enforcement action under UfP
with the support of at least one permanent member, which is borne out in
practice. 125
Within such a decentralised order, as the ICJ noted, each organ must
“in the first place at least, determine its own jurisdiction.”126 This suggests a
residual, although limited, role for judicial review. The ICJ cannot subject
an Assembly resolution to the same form of review as found in domestic
constitutional systems, as it does not possess the power to generally
invalidate a decision according to a hierarchy of norms. 127 The ICJ’s
advisory jurisdiction has no binding force, and decisions taken in
contentious cases would only produce legal effects for parties in those
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proceedings.128 This is not to deny the wider (de)legitimising force of an
ICJ decision; if it were to hold an Assembly resolution to be ultra vires,
states may voluntarily desist from relying on the resolution as a legal basis
for action.129 But the perceived validity of an Assembly resolution would
also be dictated by other factors which cannot be readily discounted,
including the conviction of the large number of members within the
Assembly who impliedly asserted the legal position that a resolution is intra
vires to the organ’s powers.
Even so, as noted above, it is very unlikely that the ICJ would cast
doubt on the legality of an Assembly resolution given the broad approach it
has taken to implied powers. Such unlikelihood is further reinforced by the
deferential standard of review adopted by the ICJ. A resolution would have
to be “manifestly ultra vires” to be invalidated by the ICJ. 130 As Judge
Fitzmaurice noted when reviewing the validity of UfP expenditure, “only if
the invalidity of the expenditure was apparent on the face of the matter, or
too manifest to be open to reasonable doubt, would such a prima facie
presumption [of validity] not arise.” 131 A resolution that violated the jus
cogens is indicative of a fundamental defect. 132 A resolution supporting
strong UfP, duly certified by the Assembly as falling within the purposes of
the U.N., would not sustain a finding of manifest ultra vires by the ICJ.
2.

U.N. Practice and Interpretation

The purpose of this analysis has been to lay the foundation for the
argument that the Assembly’s passage of the UfP resolution reflected an
accepted interpretation by the membership as to the scope of this organ’s
powers under the U.N. Charter. Furthermore, any future resolution
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recommending coercive measures would have an authorising effect.
making this argument, it is necessary to address two major concerns.
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First, it may be argued that members’ intent as to the permissibility of
strong UfP cannot readily be discerned from the existing body of
resolutions. Powers under the U.N. Charter may develop, but as the VCLT
provides, this must come with “subsequent practice.” 133 The ICJ, in its 1971
Advisory Opinion regarding South Africa’s continued presence in Namibia,
advised that this practice must be “established.” 134 On this view, if the
Assembly recommended coercive measures in the future, it would lack the
legal basis to do so unless and until such measures become customary. The
assumption underpinning this argument is that if a power cannot be
discerned from the text, it is necessary to establish that it has emerged as a
“customary power” after a long gestation period.135
Yet, the suggestion that there is no practice supporting strong UfP is
misconceived. Although the Council’s 1950 resolution on Korea appeared
to endorse collective self-defence, it was passed amidst debate as to the legal
viability of Council “authorisations” in the absence of Article 43 special
agreements to establish a standing force.136 This demonstrates that Council
members regarded Resolution 83, in response to the North Korean attack on
South Korea, as authorising U.N. enforcement action; otherwise, any
discussion on the resolution’s authorising effect would clearly be
superfluous.137 Moreover, it is intriguing to note that once the Soviet Union
resumed its seat on the Council and vetoed the continuation of enforcement
action, the Assembly resolution that supported continuation went even
further than the Council’s seemingly more limited mandate. Assembly
Resolution 376 sought to achieve “a unified, independent and democratic
government of Korea,” including the crossing of the 38th parallel, an
objective that clearly goes beyond the stricter confines of self-defence
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principles. 138 There was a general recognition amongst states and other
actors that Korea was a U.N. operation, not self-defence.139
Even beyond Korea, there is some support for Assemblyrecommended enforcement action in the context of peacekeeping operations.
While the essential premise of such operations is host state consent, there
have been episodes where the consenting government has disintegrated, thus
engaging peacekeeping troops in broader enforcement measures against
secessionist fighters and mercenaries. This argument provides some
explanation for the mandate of the U.N. Operation in the Congo (ONUC),
which given the lack of government stability was based more broadly on
maintaining Congo’s territorial integrity against secessionist fighters and
facilitating a process in which a new government could be elected. 140 The
Assembly’s endorsement of this mandate, albeit temporary, provides tacit
support for this organ’s capacity to recommend voluntary enforcement
action. 141 Although there is only limited practice of strong UfP, this does
not negate its probative value, given that U.N. enforcement action is itself a
rare occurrence. What is important from these examples is the absence of
any significant dissent to the Assembly authorising enforcement action,
which provides the strongest evidence of the constitutionality of these
measures.142
Additionally, the notion that there must always be an established
practice for an organ to exercise implied powers is open to debate. The
requirement of “established practice” exists in order to distil a general
consensus amongst the membership that the treaty in question necessarily
includes the powers that are asserted. This is readily apparent from Article
31 of the VCLT, which refers to “any subsequent practice . . . which
establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation.” 143
Finally, it falls upon the members themselves to interpret the scope of an
organ’s powers under the U.N. Charter.144 This is based on the principle that
138
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an interpretation of the treaty is as binding on the parties as the treaty
itself. 145 During the drafting of the U.N. Charter, the point was made that if
an interpretation of the treaty “is not generally acceptable it will be without
binding force,” thus recognising that interpretations receiving general
approval will be authoritative.146 Furthermore, in Legal Consequences of the
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, the ICJ
confirmed that the Assembly had the competency to interpret its own powers
under Article 12 of the U.N. Charter. 147 Therefore, while a debate may
ensue about the scope of the Assembly’s powers and the proper legal
method for determining it, ultimately the organisation derives the source of
its authority from the membership. The scope of powers is to be determined
by the members themselves.
Admittedly, this will often require a long gestation period to evince an
accepted interpretation, especially if there is interpretive disagreement
amongst members. It may also take a long time because the general
membership is unable to directly manifest its will over the organ interpreting
particular powers under the U.N. Charter. For example, the Council has
adopted a practice of interpreting Article 27 “concurring” votes to not
include abstentions. 148 In the Namibia Advisory Opinions, the ICJ noted
that this had become established practice within the Council, but what is
significant is the court’s observation that this practice “has been generally
accepted by Members of the United Nations.” 149 The ICJ thus
acknowledged the sovereignty of U.N. members to control interpretation of
the Charter. That a practice needed to develop to evince the members’ intent
is explicable by the fact that the general membership to which the ICJ refers
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was not initially engaged in the Council’s interpretive exercise of defining
what constitutes a concurring vote.
The key point from this analysis is that the membership is vested with
authority to interpret the U.N. Charter, but this may manifest in different
ways and, moreover, at differing rates of rapidity. Uniquely, the Assembly
comprises the entire U.N. membership. It thus has the capacity to crystallise
an accepted interpretation of the U.N. Charter in a much more direct form
than the other organs, who rely on the more laborious process of showing
acquiescence from the general membership over time. 150 When members
vote for an Assembly resolution, they are necessarily asserting or implying a
position relative to one or more legal propositions raised. 151 They are
claiming that the Assembly has the competence to act in the manner it
intended in the resolution. Unlike the other organs, the Assembly is
therefore able, if the political will exists, to render an accepted interpretation
of the U.N. Charter with unusual rapidity. Where this is the case, action
taken with the active support of a significant majority of states is not ultra
vires but rather reflects the powers of the Assembly within a dynamic
constitutional system. 152
Still, the basic objection to this argument is that the Assembly could,
in a single resolution such as UfP, authoritatively interpret the scope of its
implied powers. To accept that a single resolution can generate a
constitutional power would be akin to finding that the Assembly is a
legislative body. Indeed, a proposal by the Philippine delegation conferring
legislative powers on the Assembly was rejected during the drafting of the
U.N. Charter.153 Rather, there is a need for significant persistent recitation
of a resolution to evince members’ intent. 154 Thus, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights attained the status of customary international
law not because of its affirmation in a single resolution but because of its
recitation in subsequent resolutions. 155 Members should not be held to their
150
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vote on resolutions that they regarded as meaningless or subject to
change: there should be no obstacle to a “change of heart” by members.156
Under this reasoning, a single resolution by the Assembly authorising
coercive action would be insufficient to establish a constitutional power.
A resolution’s interpretive significance will turn on whether it is
reasonable to expect the state to remain faithful to its vote in the future.157
The issue is not whether an Assembly recommendation is binding, but
whether it evinces sufficient evidence from the U.N. general membership as
to the scope of the Assembly’s constitutional powers. The legal significance
of a resolution will depend on the language employed, its motives, and the
general context that led to its passage.158 The context of the deadlock over
Korea in 1950 constituted, to borrow a phrase, a “Grotian moment” that
brought into focus the acute need for constitutional realignment, meaning
that the Assembly resolution was to be taken as representing the members’
accepted interpretation of the power of the Assembly to recommend
coercive measures. 159 That the vote was overwhelmingly in favour of the
resolution (fifty-two to five, with two abstentions) further supports its
certification as an accepted interpretation of the Assembly’s powers under
the U.N. Charter. Similarly, if the Assembly were to recommend coercive
measures in the form of a humanitarian intervention to avert serious human
rights abuse, the votes of members would be taken to represent their
categorical view as to the powers of the Assembly. This conclusion would
be further enhanced were the Assembly to debate the constitutionality of any
proposed measure, emphasizing that the membership accepted the
significance of their Assembly vote. Therefore, even a single resolution
affirming the Assembly’s coercive power, given the solemnity of the context
and its constitutional significance, would constitute an accepted
interpretation of the powers of the Assembly under the U.N. Charter.
This leads to the second criticism of majoritarian constitution
making—that such an approach holds minorities to a constitutional
interpretation they do not support. More fundamentally, this majoritarian
conception essentially subjects legal text to a political process, where any
156
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resolution is legally validated no matter how far removed it is from the
language of the Charter and the originally attributed powers of the organ.
Thus, the principle of state consent is not “frontally assaulted but cunningly
outflanked.”160 It is true that the Assembly could endorse a course of action
that is ultra vires. The validity of an act by an organ rests with the members
themselves, with their assent validating an act that is otherwise
unconstitutional.161 However, concerns may be raised that the powers of the
Assembly are open to abuse where there is too much constitutional latitude
for change. This is inevitably a concern within a dynamic constitutional
system where the locus of power is the membership itself, but there are still
reasons to be optimistic that the Assembly will capably provide its own
customary checks and balances, particularly given its universal and diverse
composition. Indeed, it is noteworthy that the Assembly debate in 1950 on
UfP represented a wide spectrum of viewpoints, with the ultimate
justification for UfP not deriving from a crude argument of unfettered power
but based on a close teleological reading of the U.N. Charter and the
adoption of an interpretation that fell within a spectrum of reasonable
interpretive possibilities.162
Further, the criticism that minority-voting members are held to the
legal effect of resolutions against their will can be persuasively addressed.
The requirement of member unanimity remains an important mechanism for
constitutional reform in many international organisations, but the U.N.
Charter explicitly departs from this principle. This was necessary because
otherwise a single state would effectively hold veto power over the U.N.’s
constitutional development, which is problematic with a near universal
membership. 163 The inclusion of majoritarian decision-making is thus
underpinned by the need for the U.N. Charter to be effective in achieving its
purposes, the same teleological assumption supporting the Assembly’s
strong UfP powers. Thus, both the Council and Assembly can act where
there is majority support.164 An amendment to the U.N. Charter does not
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require unanimity but rather requires a two-thirds majority. 165 By analogy,
Michael Akehurst argued that if a large number of members in the minority
could unsuccessfully oppose an amendment, then it must follow that the
distillation of a constitutional power could be supported with similar voting
outcomes. 166 Furthermore, the ICJ has never insisted upon unanimity when
evaluating the relevance of subsequent practice to determining members’
agreement, noting in the Namibia Advisory Opinion that the practice at issue
“has been generally accepted . . . .” 167 It is therefore reasonable to assume
that U.N. members accepted the possibility that subsequent interpretations
may not be ones that they preferred. 168
That said, one potential hurdle to an Assembly resolution having
constitutional effects concerns the actual size of the majority. The argument
above is premised on members expressing their will through the Assembly
as to the scope of this organ’s powers. However, this premise is undermined
where the technical majority achieved for a resolution does not significantly
represent the will of the membership. Under Article 18(2) of the U.N.
Charter, an Assembly resolution only requires the affirmative votes of twothirds of those “present and voting,” and not the membership as a whole.
The legal or legitimising value of a resolution that only has the support of a
small number of members would “tend towards zero.” 169 This is a valid
point, in that an interpretation of the U.N. Charter would require the support
of a significant number of members for it to be accepted. An actual twothirds majority of U.N. members, rather than a technical majority, is
therefore required.170
C.

Constitutional Controls on the Assembly’s UfP Powers

A compelling case may therefore be made for strong UfP, grounded in
the doctrine of implied powers and a teleological interpretation of the U.N.’s
foundational documents. Nonetheless, questions remain about the scope of
UfP and the legal considerations that the Assembly should take into account
165
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when recommending coercive measures. As there is limited UfP practice in
this area, and none in the context of humanitarian intervention, this paper
suggests a possible legal framework, which may provide guidance for the
future application of UfP to questions of humanitarian intervention.
1.

Council Trigger for UfP

The first consideration is what role the Council should perform under
UfP. The Assembly may act where the Council has failed in its primary
responsibility, but the UfP specifies that the Council may request that the
Assembly convene an emergency special session.171 The UfP resolution also
triggers the Assembly’s consideration of a situation where a majority of
U.N. members make such a request. While either the Assembly or Council
may trigger the UfP procedure, there is good reason, grounded in practice,
for the Council to make this determination.
First, to do so respects the language of Article 12 of the U.N. Charter
in that the Council’s request would constitute a certification that it is no
longer “exercising” its functions on a particular situation. 172 This would
provide the Assembly with a broad constitutional mandate to make
appropriate recommendations. By respecting the Council’s right to trigger
UfP, harmony will be maintained between the two organs.173 If the Council
made such a request, it would amount to a procedural vote, and thus would
not be subject to the veto of the permanent members. Under Article 27(2), a
procedural matter does not require unanimity, but a qualified majority of
Council members (nine out of fifteen). The interpretation of such a vote as a
procedural matter is reinforced by the organization of the U.N. Charter,
which places a request by the Security Council for the Assembly to convene
a special session under the section labelled “Procedure.”174
Second, as the Assembly would be taking coercive measures in
recommending humanitarian intervention it is necessary to find that a
situation constitutes a “threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of
aggression” under Article 39 of the U.N. Charter. The Assembly could very
well arrive at this determination itself as a necessary prerequisite to acting
under UfP. Indeed, the Assembly has characterised situations as such in
171
172
173
174
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many resolutions.175 But given that the Council is empowered to make a
determination under this provision, where it makes a request to the
Assembly it is implicitly qualifying the situation as one in which coercive
measures may be taken. 176 This would not only buttress the Assembly’s
power to recommend enforcement action but ensure that there is inter-organ
consensus that a situation qualifies for such measures being taken.
Third, practice establishes the Council’s integral role in triggering the
UfP mechanism where armed forces are to be engaged. Thus, it was the
Council who first made the request to the Assembly with respect to major
conflicts, both international (Korea, Suez, Hungary, and Afghanistan) and
internal (Congo). 177 By contrast, the Assembly invoked UfP without a
Council request only in non-conflict situations, such as the process of
decolonisation and the question concerning Palestinian statehood. 178 The
established practice of the Council triggering the UfP procedures in conflict
situations provides an effective check on the Assembly. This does not mean,
however, that the Assembly is unable to invoke UfP of their own volition.
Ultimately, the Assembly has control over its agenda, but to assume
jurisdiction it must assess whether the Council has failed to exercise its
primary responsibility. 179 But the involvement of the Council in requesting
Assembly action serves to address any lingering (albeit unfounded) concerns
that the Council is being constitutionally usurped, further legitimating the
process and ensuring it has support of at least some permanent members,
which may be necessary to ensure successful action.
2.

Predicates to Assembly Action Under UfP

The Assembly may act in instances where, “because of lack of
unanimity of the permanent members, [the Council] fails to exercise its
primary responsibility.” 180 There are two conditions: that the veto has been
exercised, and that this results in the Council “failing” to exercise its primary
responsibility. 181 Therefore, not all negative decisions will justify the
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invocation of UfP, the veto being a legitimate Charter technique to prevent
the overregulation of international peace and security. 182
A narrow approach in determining Council “failure” is to apply the
abuse of rights doctrine, which requires that the right-holders (permanent
members) not use their veto in a manner that causes harm to the
community. 183 An abuse may be manifested where a decision is arbitrary,
taken for an extraneous purpose, or in bad faith.184 The language of “abuse”
captures the moral impetus and discourse of recent condemnations of
Council vetoes.185 However, finding abuse is likely to prove elusive. To be
sure, permanent members have vetoed resolutions for extraneous purposes.
The United States vetoed the extension of peacekeeping mandates in Bosnia
and Herzegovina because it had not received a concession in the drafting of
the ICC Statute. 186 Similarly, China ended a peacekeeping operation in
Macedonia, apparently because Yugoslavia recognised Taiwan’s
statehood. 187 These decisions pursued purposes that were extraneous to that
of collective peace and security. 188 However, most negative votes are, at
least ostensibly, connected to the Council’s broad purposes, with
disagreement between the permanent members focused on the appropriate
measures to take. When China and Russia vetoed a Council resolution on
Syria, they did so on the basis that U.N. action would be
counterproductive. 189 Similarly, in vetoing a referral to the ICC, Russia
cautioned this measure would throw “oil to the fire” during on-going
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hostilities in Syria. 190 The notion that these permanent members abused
their rights rather than acting in pursuit of international security may be
difficult to objectively ascertain.
A better approach is to find “failure” where a proposed Council
resolution was vetoed in a given situation despite evidence of the risk or
existence of serious human rights abuse. Using human rights abuse as a
trigger for UfP is acceptable because while the Council has primary
responsibility for peace and security, the Assembly enjoys primacy in the
promotion of human rights under the U.N. Charter. 191 The Assembly’s
central role in promoting human rights is reinforced by the ICJ’s Legal
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in Occupied Palestinian
Territory advisory opinion, which notes that while the “Council has tended
to focus on the aspects of such matters related to international peace and
security, the General Assembly has taken a broader view, considering also
their humanitarian, social and economic aspects.”192 Indeed, it is apparent
from many Assembly resolutions that there is an underlying concern about
the human consequences of conflict. 193 This is generally in contrast to
practice during the Cold War, where UfP was utilised in response to interstate acts of aggression and occupation. 194 This narrower approach not only
provides a suitable fit with the Assembly’s primary humanitarian functions,
but may also carry greater political appeal to those states who contemplate
spearheading a UfP resolution but who perceive it to be a “double-edged
sword.”195
However, UfP contemplates the Assembly acting where there has
been a “breach of the peace” in contrast to a “threat to the peace.” This is
material, as on the few occasions that the Council characterised a situation as
a “breach of the peace,” the situation involved inter-state hostilities or use of
force by a de facto regime against a state.196 As noted above, this definition
thus excludes intra-state situations of the type that engage with the
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humanitarian intervention doctrine.197 The view that this justifiably places
limits on the Assembly’s powers is misplaced. The term “breach of the
peace” is broad enough to encompass internal situations.198 The difference
between these terms is one of degree, as a threat may mature into a breach.
There must be evidence of a breach, as opposed to a reasonable belief that a
given state of affairs threatens to become one. How this manifests itself in a
situation of grave human rights abuse is open for interpretation, and as with
Council determinations on such matters, the discretion to identify a breach
must rest with the Assembly itself.199
There exists a great deal of convergence in the international
community as to the types of human rights abuses that warrant intervention.
The responsibility to protect (RtoP) doctrine supports measures to protect
populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic
cleansing. 200 Similarly, the British and French would justify intervention
where there is evidence of “overwhelming human catastrophe” or “mass
atrocity” respectively. 201 Of course, there could be some penumbra of doubt
as to when a situation qualifies as a grave human rights abuse. Yet while
problems of scope and intensity remain, RtoP offers sufficient criteria of
seriousness to avoid or mitigate abusive invocation of human rights as
justification for unlawful intervention. 202 The most important issue is
whether the entity applying such standards is capable of doing so in an
objective and principled way.
The problem is not with the principle, but with the application. The
World Summit in 2005 endorsed RtoP, but in practice the doctrine has
stumbled because of disagreement over the suitability of measures to address
such crises. Ultimately, however, the shortcomings of RtoP have arisen
because its locus of operation has been within the Council where the
disagreement of a single permanent member could result in deadlock. While
there may be merit in placing limits on the regulation of international peace
197
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and security, the application of UfP to humanitarian crises would not
necessarily mean an increase in U.N. enforcement action. The same
arguments made by China and Russia to block further measures in Syria
could equally resonate in a failed Assembly resolution. 203 Indeed, the
political environment would have to be such that states contemplating a
humanitarian intervention feel assured of wide support in the Assembly—a
level of formal support that Council- or region-led operations, with their
much smaller number of voting members, could never have. The notion that
the U.N. would become involved in more enforcement actions with a liberal
interpretation of powers under the U.N. Charter belies the political
complexity in organising and securing a consensus, and also the
exceptionality of using military force. But in instances of large-scale human
rights abuse that shock the conscience of the international community,
coupled with Council inaction, the UfP mechanism provides legal
justification for the Assembly to make recommendations up to and including
the use of force under a U.N. mandate.
III.

CONCLUSION

Through the lens of the humanitarian intervention doctrine, this article
argued that Assembly resolutions may acquire certain legal effects, in turn
presenting the Assembly as a viable alternative to the Council in augmenting
collective responses to security crises. In particular, it was noted that
Assembly resolutions serve as an aid in determining members’ general
agreement as to the scope of this organ’s powers under the U.N. Charter. No
U.N. organ has interpretive supremacy, it being incumbent on each organ, in
the first instance at least, to define its own jurisdictional scope. When the
Assembly passes a resolution, its members thus implicitly assert a legal
claim as to the scope of the organ’s powers. The legal claim may be that
such resolutions are purely hortatory, as is commonplace in practice. But
equally, Assembly members have constitutional licence to interpret the
organ’s powers more broadly, such as to recognise an implied power to
authorise enforcement action, as the Assembly did in 1950 under the UfP
mechanism. It may be that the members’ legal claim on the Assembly’s
jurisdictional scope is not always clearly articulated within a resolution, thus
necessitating recitation and affirmation in subsequent resolutions. But
where the intention of a resolution is clear, and it obtains the support of a
203
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substantial majority of U.N. members via consensual procedures, it
constitutes an accepted interpretation of the Assembly’s powers under the
U.N. Charter.
Furthermore, Assembly resolutions pursuant to UfP may delegate
enforcement authority to willing states acting under a U.N. mandate. Here
the legal effect of the resolution is primarily internal, by specifying the
nature and extent of the authority that is subject to delegation, but there is
also some extrinsic effect to the resolution, in that it provides a legal
justification for action that would otherwise contravene international law.
The “authorising” quality of a UfP resolution serves to bring the contributing
state, now acting under a U.N. mandate, into a special legal regime, and not
subject to specific obligations under Article 2(4) that would otherwise
prevent it from using force.
Establishing that Assembly resolutions have such legal effect is
necessary in order for the Assembly to effectively assume responsibility for
international peace and security in the event of a Council deadlock.
Whereas the Council expressly possesses mandatory and coercive powers
that facilitate its regulation of international security, a more creative and
teleological approach is necessary when fashioning the Assembly’s implied
powers. The U.N. Charter is sufficiently vague for varied interpretations as
to the scope of powers and purposes. However, it has been argued here that
these questions of interpretive disagreement are ultimately vested with the
membership to resolve through consensual procedures. Through UfP, the
membership has the capacity to assert its views in varying degrees where the
Council has failed to maintain international peace and security.
This inevitably leads to the question of whether such a bold assertion
of power will ever materialise again. This article focused on technical
aspects of the acquired legal effects of Assembly resolutions, but in doing so
it revealed that interpretation is itself underpinned by a normative
commitment to a given conception of collective security. Engaging in a
teleological interpretation of the U.N. Charter brings into sharp focus the
question of not just what the organization was established to do but what it
ought to do in response to contemporary security concerns. The U.N.
Charter has proved remarkably adaptable to changing circumstances in
international politics, from the growth of Assembly competencies during the
Cold War to the reawakening of an extraordinarily powerful Council
thereafter. From initially conceiving of collective security as a mechanism
to repel acts of aggression, it is now safe to say that collective security is
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also defined by its ability to ensure respect for and the protection of human
rights. With a shift in paradigms, it is not inconceivable that the Assembly,
realigning UfP to address humanitarian crises instead of Cold War acts of
aggression, could obtain sufficient support to act on behalf of the collective
security community to recommend measures up to and including the use of
force.
The attainment of collective security continually raises questions of
legality and legitimacy, sometimes in dichotomous terms. That the NATO
humanitarian intervention in Kosovo was of doubtful legality was arguably
excused because it was seen as legitimate. The clear legal basis of the arrest
warrant for Al-Bashir, underpinned by a Council decision, did not prevent
trenchant criticism from African states over the International Criminal
Court’s legitimacy. The undoubted legal basis for China and Russia to veto
a referral of Syrian atrocities to the ICC did not prevent widespread
condemnation in the international community of the Council’s vote. But the
UfP mechanism, when properly used and supported by a consensus of U.N.
members, holds the promise of promoting both legality and legitimacy in the
attainment of collective security objectives that would otherwise be
unreachable due to Council deadlock.

